Lo de siempre: seguimos con nuestro proyecto de leernos la revista Byte… con cuarenta años de retraso, y esta vez con un añadido final extra. El tema del mes… ¡la robótica! (Tema que vamos a ignorar bastante completamente, porque no me pone nada. Pero las portadas de Byte son un clásico, o sea que aquí va la del mes:

Comencemos, pues, por la editorial:
![A Threat to Future Software
Last October Digital Research Inc. yielded to pressure from Apple and agreed to change its GEM software to decrease its resemblance to Apple Macintosh software. (GEM is an operating environment for several MS-DOS- and PC-DOS-based computers that allows a user to interact with a computer via windows and icons rather than the usual text-only commands.) Let's ignore, for the moment, the uncertain worth of a "visual copyright" (the legal term for Apple's copyrighting of the overall "look" of Macintosh software). Let's also ignore the ethics of Apple's actions. The point to focus on, instead, is that Apple's actions are to no one's benefit: Both the microcomputer industry and Apple itself will suffer from their effects.
Apple's actions will slow the growth of the microcomputer industry, which will hurt Apple by shrinking the potential microcomputer audience. Already, several small companies are worried that some project they're working on (and, often, they with it) will be cut down because it is "too Mac-like." In addition, the success of Apple's tactics may encourage other companies to try similar actions, thus increasing the paralysis and anxiety in the industry.
These actions will stifle the incremental evolution that is at the root of any significant growth in our industry. By "incremental evolution" I mean the process of gradual improvement of a product type that eventually leads to a more robust, useful product. For example, Ashtonlate's Framework did not spring full-blown from the heads of the programming team at Forefront. It had its roots in Dan Bricklin's and Bob Franston's VisiCalc spreadsheet, Sorcim's Supercalc (which added functions and sold to a market not supported by VisiCalc), Mitch Kapor's VisiPlot (which gave the distinctive highlighted menu bar now used in so many programs), the software integration of Lotus 1-2-3, and the icons, windows, and pulldown menus of— well, you get the point. If companies are afraid to go to market with what they think are incremental— but distinct— improvements on a basic design, we will become a stagnant industry bounded by the usual and comfortable.
According to Irving Rappaport. Apple's associate general counsel, Apple's intent is to prevent other companies from creating products that are easy to use because of their similarity to the Macintosh. "If people look at it and say, 'Gee. that's like the Mac— I can operate that,' when that's the result you get, it's over the line" of infringement of Apple's copyrights. The effect of this intent is to fragment the industry in the face of what was becoming a de facto standard for human-computer interaction. This lack of standardization will cause many people to stay uninterested in computers because they will have to relearn basic skills with each brand of computer they encounter. (Imagine how many people would drive cars if car manufacturers used different controls for every function in the car.)
Apple might argue that, by claiming a larger slice of a smaller pie, it will still come out ahead. We believe that it will be hurt directly by its actions and will end up with a smaller piece of a pie that is itself smaller. Apple will, in effect, build a wall around its ghetto of Macintosh products, thus limiting its own growth and encouraging people to "live" elsewhere.
Texas Instruments' TI-99/4A provides a good example. TI announced that it intended to directly profit from all software written for its machine by forcing third-party software developers to publish their products through TI. When a brave few brought out 99/4 cartridges on their own. TI added a proprietary chip to their cartridges that the computer required before it would run the enclosed software. Needless to say, the few developers working on 99/4 software wisely turned to support other computers.
The same may happen to Apple. IBM already sells over half the business computers bought today, and IBM PC-compatibles account for a fairly large slice of what's left. If Apple has been slowing the erosion of its market share to IBM with the Macintosh line (and I think it has), its current moves will alienate software and hardware developers, who will begin to lavish their creativity upon the more congenial IBM PC-compatible marketplace. And where innovation goes, the market will follow.
Consider: IBM made its software and hardware architectures open. It allowed the development of innumerable hardware clones, many far more similar to IBM products than GEM is to the Macintosh desktop; consequently, the IBM PC-compatible market far outdistanced its combined competitors in less than two years. On the other hand, Apple is actively discouraging not only copying but also borrowing from its software design. It claims the sole right to benefit from a set of ideas that Apple itself has borrowed and improved on (the most direct borrowing was from work done at Xerox PARC). Given these two opposing directions, what do you think will happen?
A Call to Action
We at BYTE call on Apple to recognize the long-term implications of its actions and limit itself to prosecuting cases where the alleged theft is not of "looks" but of actual program code. Barring that, we call on Apple to license its allegedly copyrightable interface to markets that do not directly compete with its current or planned product line— if the licensing fees are reasonable, everyone will profit.
If neither of these things happen, we call on the judicial system to hand down rulings that reflect a strict interpretation of the visual copyright laws— that is. that a product is at fault only if it shows no distinguishing characteristics in appearance or operation from the alleged original; this would protect products that show incremental evolution. We also call on the industry to do two things. The first is to stand up to Apple and see the case decided on its legal merits. The second is to develop an alternative graphic interface and allow its wide adoption throughout the non-Apple computer community; in this way. the rest of us can get on with the business of making computers— in general— good enough that everyone will want to use them.
[Editor's note: Apple maintains that the agreement covers "only three specific products," but one of them is GEM Desktop, which defines the overall GEM environment. Also, according to Kathleen Dixon of Apple, the agreement includes any custom work DRI has done, including the modified GEM software that Atari uses in its 520ST computer] ■ —Gregg Williams, Senior Technical Editor](https://i0.wp.com/obm.corcoles.net/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/image.png?resize=715%2C1024&ssl=1)
¿Creíais que Apple se quejaba solo de que Microsoft la copia? (Todo sea dicho: a lo largo de la historia Microsoft ha copiado cosas de Apple… y hasta hay casos en los que Apple ha copiado de Microsoft. Y donde dice Microsoft, puede decirse Google/Android.) Pues antes de quejarse de Microsoft y Windows, se quejaron de GEM, la capa gráfica de Digital Research para sistemas PC/MS-DOS (y no solo estos: volvemos sobre el tema más abajo). Respetando la propiedad intelectual de Apple (más que el editor de Byte, después de leerle), comparto con él que con estas cosas, entonces y ahora, el consumidor sale perdiendo bastante.
Seguimos con los «microbytes» la sección de noticias breves. En esta ocasión, por un lado, evolucionamos con algo que ya habíamos visto por aquí… a las pantallas planas LCD les llega el color:

Y por el otro (literalmente, hay que girar la página para llegar a ello), desmontamos un poco el mito de que Kodak murió por no innovar en fotografía digital:

…y es que pocas compañías investigaron e invirtieron en el campo de la fotografía digital como Kodak, que acumuló una inmensa bolsa de patentes sobre el tema. Lo que mató a Kodak (bastantes años después de 1986) fue, sobre todo, el miedo a canibalizar su mercado «químico».
Nos vamos, ahora, a la publicidad:

Sí, amigas, 1986 es el año de volar a 2400 baudios, no a los «viejos» 1200. Casi dos kilobits y medio, sí. ¿Recordáis la tortura que es tener cobertura «solo» 4G y descargar cosas a pocos megabits? (Pero no os emocionéis: no todas las líneas telefónicas de la época soportaban esa barbaridad de velocidad.)
Y seguimos mirando anuncios, con un momento histórico: ¡el primer anuncio que vemos de Windows!

No os pongo el publirreportaje entero (8 páginas tenía en total, que Microsoft ya tenía unos dineros en la época), pero sí os dejo aquí esta maravilla de gráficos:

¿Reconocéis vuestro Windows «de toda la vida»? Yo tampoco.
Hablábamos antes de GEM… y lo recuperamos aquí, porque en este número se analizaba el Atari ST, la tercera de las máquinas con procesador Motorola 68000, después del Macintosh y el Amiga (recordemos siempre: Amiga mejor que ST mejor que Mac). Y el sistema operativo del ST era, efectivamente, el GEM de Digital Research (bueno, GEM era, como con los PCs, la capa gráfica sobre TOS, el verdadero sistema operativo).

Y… ¿vamos a comparar GEM con Windows, tal y como lo presentaba la mismísima Microsoft en su campaña publicitaria?

(Eso sí: reconoceremos que el parecido con el sistema operativo de los Macintosh es más que notable. Es innegable.)
Seguimos con nuestra sección «esto no lo ponemos en una revista hoy, que nos lapidan» con un programa en BASIC para dibujar superficies 3D:

Ojo, que el programa tenía una cierta complejidad y hasta ocultaba las superficies ocultas:

(Si esto no os fuera suficiente, os podéis ir a la página 397 para ver cómo implementar el algoritmo de Euclides para calcular el máximo común divisor.)
He dicho que me iba a saltar la robótica, pero sí me quedo con uno de los artículos de la sección:

Y después de la visión venía una pieza dedicada a los sensores táctiles, otra sobre navegación autónoma y una sobre IA en visión por ordenador. De nuevo, uno no sabe si estamos en el 86 o en el 26 (y no se siente con ánimos de explicar a los autores que a la cosa aún le quedaban unas pocas décadas).
Y echamos una última mirada a la publi, y es que creo que no habíamos reflejado por aquí la maravillosa campaña «Charlot» de IBM:

Que no fue un único anuncio, os lo aseguro: años, duró la campaña, siempre visualmente maravillosa. Os dejo aquí un recopilatorio de anuncios televisivos.
Y nos vamos a ir con otro momento histórico:

Acorn RISC Machine… A, R, M. La arquitectura del chip de tu móvil. O de tu Mac, si tienes uno. Y ahí estáis, viendo, en riguroso directo, su nacimiento. Casi nada.
Y hasta aquí la Byte del mes. Si queréis hacer los deberes para el mes que viene, como siempre, aquí tenéis los archivos de la revista Byte en archive.org.
Y esto habría sido todo… pero el otro día me enteré de la muerte de Stewart Cheifet (hasta el New York Times le dedicó un obituario). ¿Que quién es Stewart Cheifet? No me digáis que no habéis visto nunca su Computer Chronicles. Si Byte es, al menos para mí, uno de los recursos imprescindibles en formato prensa escrita para revisar la historia de la informática, Computer Chronicles es lo mismo, pero en formato vídeo. Los archivos del programa de la PBS, la tele pública de Estados Unidos (lamentablemente en peligro de muerte, gracias a la administración Trump y su alergia a la información de calidad), son un documento esencial si te interesa el periodo de 1983 a 2000. Y como homenaje, y como estas entradas sobre Byte <ironía>no son lo suficientemente largas</ironía>, he pensado que completarlas con el visionado de los programas correspondientes sería, cuando menos, un ejercicio curioso1. Y os dejo aquí los programas de enero del 86…
El 7 de enero el programa arrancaba con… ¡inteligencia artificial!
(¿No os ha encantado el anuncio del patrocinio de Byte? 😅)
No podemos dejar de comentar el copresentador del programa con Cheifet: nada más y nada menos que el malogrado Gary Kildall, creador de CP/M… y de GEM. Hay múltiples universos paralelos al nuestro en que amamos y odiamos a Kildall, CP/M y GEM y no recordamos quién era Bill Gates ni sabemos nada de un sistema operativo llamado Windows.
El Jerrold Kaplan que sale en la primera entrevista, por cierto, trabajaba por aquel entonces con Mitch Kapor, fundó en 1987 Go, dedicada a lo que luego se llamarían PDAs y luego fundaría el primer sitio web de subastas (cinco meses antes de eBay). Not bad. Y también podemos destacar la presencia del filósofo Hubert Dreyfus dudando fuertemente de la expertez de los sistemas expertos de la época :-).
Maravilloso también que los expertos apuntaban que 1986 podría ser el año del reconocimiento del habla 😅.
Después, el día 14, otro tema del que no se habla nada en la actualidad: seguridad informática.
…aunque en aquel momento esto se refería al uso de ordenadores para perseguir delitos, peleándose con catálogos de huellas digitales o usando sistemas de información geográficos, por ejemplo, pero también digitalizando procesos como en cualquier otra organización.
Os recomendaría, eso sí, saltar al minuto 27:30 del vídeo, en el que Cheifet habla de los gráficos de la peli El Secreto de la Pirámide… creados por un «nuevo ordenador gráfico, creado por Industrial Light & Magic, una división de LucasFilm. El ordenador se llama… «Pixar».
Y no sigo porque, según esta lista de episodios en la Wikipedia, el siguiente no se emitiría hasta febrero.
Apa, el mes que viene más (ya decidiremos si solo con Byte o con el añadido de Computer Chronicles).
- Un ejercicio curioso que, inevitablemente, no se me ha ocurrido solo a mí: veo que alguien ha montado un computerchronicles.blog y que ya lleva nada menos que los primeros 133 programas revisitados. ↩︎

















![Skycam: An Aerial Robotic Camera System
A microcomputer provides the control to add three-dimensional mobility to TV and motion picture cameras
On a morning in March 1983, a group of technicians gathered at Haverford High School in a suburb of Philadelphia. Each brought an electrical, mechanical, or software component for a revolutionary new camera system named Skycam (see photo 1). Skycam is a suspended, mobile, remote-controlled system designed to bring three-dimensional mobility to motion picture and television camera operation. (See the text box on page 128.) I used an Osborne 1 to develop Skycam's control program in my basement, and it took me eight months of evenings and weekends. As of 3 a.m. that morning, however, the main control loop refused to run. But 19 hours later, Skycam lurched around the field for about 15 minutes before quitting for good. Sitting up in the darkness of the press booth, hunched over the tiny 5-inch screen, 1 could see that the Osborne 1 was not fast enough to fly the Skycam smoothly.
In San Diego 18 months later, another group of technicians opened 20 matched shipping cases and began to get the Skycam ready for an NFL preseason game between the San Diego
Chargers and the San Francisco FortyNiners. The Skycam was now being run by an MC68000 microprocessor based Sage computer, and a host of other improvements had been made on the original. [Editor's note: The Sage Computer is now known as the Stride: however, the machine used by the author was purchased before the company's name change. For the purpose of the article, the machine will be referred to as the Sage.] For the next three hours, Skycam moved high over the field fascinating the fans in the stadium while giving the nationwide prime-time TV audience their first look at a new dimension in sports coverage.
Skycam represents an innovative use of microcomputers. The portable processing power needed to make Skycam fly was unavailable even five years ago. That power is the "invention" upon which the Skycam patents are based. It involves the support and free movement of an object in a large volume of space. The development team used the following experiment to test the movement and operation of the Skycam.
At a football field with one lighting tower at each of four corners, the team members bolted a pulley to the top of each pole, facing inward. Then they used four motorized winches, each with 500 feet of thin steel cable on a revolving drum and put one at the base of each tower.
Next, they ran a cable from each motor to the top of its tower and threaded the cable through the pulley. They pulled all four cables from the tops of the towers out to the middle of the field and attached the cables to a metal ring 2 feet in diameter weighing 10 pounds (see figure 1). A motor operator was stationed at each winch with a control box that enabled the operator to slowly reel in or let out the cable. Each motor operator reeled the cable until the ring was suspended a few feet from the ground, and then they were ready to demonstrate Skycam dynamics.
All four motor operators reeled in the cable. The ring moved upward quickly. If all four motors reel in at the same rate (and the layout of lighting towers is reasonably symmetrical) the ring will move straight up. In the experiment, the two motors on the left reeled in and the two on the right reeled out. The ring moved to the left and maintained its altitude. An instruction was given to the two motor operators on the left to reel out and the two on the right to reel in just a little bit. The ring moved right and descended as it moved back toward the center.
The theoretical basis of this demonstration is quite simple. For each point in the volume of space bounded by the field, the four towers and the plane of the pulleys, there is a unique set of four numbers that represents the distances between that point and each of the four pulley positions. Following the layout above for an arbitrary point on the field, you can...](https://i0.wp.com/obm.corcoles.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/image-6.png?resize=840%2C543&ssl=1)






![Figure 1: the rates of grouth of n, n log n and n squared
Listing 1: The algorithm for Selection Sort.
Selection Sort.
Input: an array, A, and its size, n.
Output: the same array A, in sorted order,
begin for i : = 1 to n do begin
m : = i;
for j : = i + 1 to n do
compare A[j] to A[m], making j the new m if it is less;
swap A[i] and A[mj;
end
end.](https://i0.wp.com/obm.corcoles.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/image-12.png?resize=438%2C994&ssl=1)
















